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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
192-200. Ex Parte Hennen decided in 1839 established this construction as the
one which this Court will follow. That this is the executive construction is
amply proved by the consistent action of all the Presidents, following the ad-
vice of their Attorney-General, in removing officers without the consent of the
Senate. The conflict was sharp over President Jackson's removal of Secretary
Duane and he refused to yield to the Senate. President Johnson dared im-
peachment rather than surrender the point, and it was insisted upon by Cleveland
in 1886, Wilson in 1920, and Coolidge in 1924.
The dissenting opinions attack the theory of the court on four general
grounds. That by Mr. Justice Holmes is, that this office is a creation of Con-
gress which has the power of control over its own creations; that of Mr. Justice
McReynolds is, that there is no such broad power inherent in the executive as
laid down by the Court and that Congress has repeatedly asserted its control;
and that by Mr. Justice Brandeis admits the control of the President over high
political officers, but points out the distinction between such officers and the
complainant W. M. T. '27.
[Due to lack of time before going to press this note contains only a digest of
the Court's opinion.]
CRIINAL LAW-ExPEIMENTS BY JURORS-INSPECTION OF CONTENTS OF BOT-
TLE.-The defendant was charged with the possession of intoxicating liquor.
After the court had directed the attention of the jury to bottles which had been
introduced in evidence one of the jurors took up one of the bottles and tasted
the contents. The defendant's motion to withdraw the case from the jury
was overruled and he duly excepted to the ruling of the court. Held, that per-
mitting the juror to taste the liquor and the refusal to withdraw the case from
the jury was reversible error. Nix v. City of Andalusia, (Ala. 1926) 109
So., 182.
In recent years two distinct lines of judicial decisions with respect to the pro-
priety of permitting jurors to taste liquor introduced in evidence and upon whose
intoxicating character the guilt of the accused depends have grown up. Cases in
which the practice has been permitted and sanctioned are: People v. Kinney (1900)
124 Mich., 486, 83 N. W., 147; Schulenberg v. State (1907) 79 Neb., 65, 112 N. W.,
304, 16 Ann. Cas., 217; State v. Simmons, (1922") 183 N. C., 684, 110 S. E., 591;
Troutner v. Commonwealth, (1923) 135 Va., 750, 115 S. E., 693. In close prox-
imity with these decisions are those holding that it is proper for the jurors
to test by their sense of smell the liquor which has been introduced in evidence.
Reed v. Territory (1908) 1 Okl. Cr., 481, 98 P. 583, 129 A. S. R., 861; Enyart v.
People, (1921) 70 Colo., 362, 201 P. 564; State v. Dascenzo, (1924) 30 N. M.,
34, 226 P. 1099. This latter doctrine also obtains in Missouri where jurors have
been permitted to "inspect and smell" the liquor introduced. Slate v. Sissom,
(Mo. 1926) 278 S. W., 704. In State v. Stapleton, (1923) 155 Minn., 499, 193
N. W., 35, it was held proper to permit the jury to pour the liquor into saucer
and touch a match thereto for the purpose of testing its alcoholic content. The
chief grounds of decision in these cases seem to be: (1) that the jurors do not
learn facts independent of evidence but simply test the evidence already intro-
duced in order properly to determine its truth or probative value; (2) that to a
juror the best and highest proof of which any fact is susceptible is the evidence
of his own senses; (3) that he should be permitted to requisition freely any or
all of these senses in the determination of a disputed question of fact because
the ultimate purpose for which the evidence is introduced is to assist the jury
in reaching the correct conclusion; (4) and that jurors must necessarily take
into consideration their knowledge and impressions founded upon experience in
their everyday life and jurors without such knowledge and impressions could
not be had.
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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
In accord with the principal case holding that it is reversible error to permit
jurors to taste liquor introduced in evidence are: State v. Lindgrove, (1895) 1
Kan. App., 51, 41 P. 688; Skinner v. State, (1925) 101 Tex. Cr. R., 68, 274 S. W.,
133; Peru v. United States, Bird v. United States, (C. C. A., 8th Circuit, 1925)
4 F., (2d) 881. The case going to the greatest length in this direction is Com-
monwealth v. Brelsford, 161 Mass., 61, 36 N. E., 677, where it was held proper
to reject an offer on the part of the defendant to have jurors taste the liquor.
There are fewer cases holding that permitting jurors to smell the liquor is im-
proper. Among these is Jianole v. United States, (C. C. A., 8th Circuit, 1924)
299 F., 496, where it was held an abuse of discretion for the court to direct an
attendant to pour a liquid into a glass "and let the jury smell of it" though no
proper objection was made at the time. These courts apparently rest their de-
cisions upon the grounds: (1) that all evidence must be introduced openly in
court; (2) that the jury must be satisfied from evidence apart from their indi-
vidual knowledge and belief; (3) that when jurors acquire knowledge peculiar
to themselves they cease to be jurors and should be sworn as witnesses; (4)
and that the court should ascertain whether all jurors are equally expert in
taste and smell. In Gallaghan v. United States, Colwell v. United States, (C. C.
A. 8th Circuit, 1924) 299 F., 172, it is said that "the practice is not in keeping
with an orderly and dignified administration of justice." That the practice,
where permitted, should be in open court, in the presence of the defendant and
at all times subject to the control of the court see, Reed v. Territory, (1908) 1
Okl. Cr. 481, 98 P. 583, 129 A. S. R., 861 ; State v. Dascenso, (1924) 30 N. M., 34,
226 P. 1099...Contra, State v. Elmers, (1924) 198 Iowa, 1041, 200 N. W., 723;
State v. Barker, (1912) 67 Wash., 595, 122 P. 335; also State v. Foell, (1923)
37 Idaho, 722, 217 P. 608 (statute permitting taking of exhibits to jury room),
holding that an examination of the liquor in the jury room was not improper.
T. S. '27.
EVIDENCE-JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A FORD CA-This case arose in an action for
damages by Mrs. Stone, plaintiff below, in which she seeks to recover for a
failure, through negligence of the company, to deliver a telegram. The tele-
gram informed her that her brother had but a few hours to live. It was not
delivered until too late for her to attend the funeral, her brother having died
shortly after the telegram was sent to her. In the trial court Mrs. Stone was
permitted to introduce evidence to the effect that she would have departed for
her brother's home immediately upon receipt of the telegram and would have
traveled in a Ford car, continuously, making the 300 miles distance in 20 hours.
The appellant Telegraph Company assigns the admission of this evidence as
error and contend that travel in this manner is not such an established and usual
mode as must have been in the contemplation of the parties when the contract
was entered into. Considering this objection the court says, "We can not as-
sent to the view that travel by a Ford automobile was not, in 1923, an established
and usual mode of travel in this state. Appellee's counsel in their brief have
ably defended the Ford car against the reflection upon it implied by the assertion
that it is not an established and usual mode of travel in this state. These as-
signments need not be discussed at length. A few observations will dispose of
same and vindicate the Ford. It is a matter of common and general knowledge
of which we may take judicial notice that in 1923, and for some years prior
thereto, Mr. Ford's car was recognized in Texas as an established, usual, and
favorite method of transportation; that, barring accidents and undue heating
the motor, it is fully capable of making 300 miles in 20 hours, even if much of the
road be unpaved and must be traveled at night. The mastery which this car
possesses over bad roads and ability to reach its destination under adverse con-
ditions are also matters of common knowledge." Western Union Telegraph
Company v. Stone (Tex. 1926) 283 S. W., 259.
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